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# **SANS GIAC Auditing Networks, Perimeters, and Systems GSNA Practical Assignment**

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## Checkpoint Firewall-1

### Part 1. Research in Audit Measurement Practice, and Control

In this research project, the Checkpoint Firewall-1 is selected to be equipment for researching and auditing. Generally, Firewall is quite different from other tools in Information Security. Not only does Firewall need to protect the network, host, and data passing through, but the system itself must be configured and set up to be secure as well.

Firewall will use the Rule Base for controlling traffic, which will allow only some certain type of packets to be passing through. Normally, such rule is very much depending on the organization security policy. Certain rule will be adapted to some organization. Therefore, there is no solid standard to be widely applied for auditing the Firewall for all organization.

To verify whether Firewall reached level of standard security, the following criteria of auditing should be applied:

1. **Operating System Audit** In this research, Firewall is run on Solaris Operating System. As a result, the security of operating system could be easily effect to security of Firewall itself. Therefore, the operating system must be securely configured and dedicated to sever only for Firewall purpose.

2. **Firewall Audit** As nature of general software, there are vulnerabilities on product. As a result, the new patch always release for improving the security of Firewall itself. Therefore, there must be a procedure to audit whether the existing version is secured.

3. **Network Audit** The Rule Base must be verified whether relevant to the requirement. Even Rule Base is specified according to policy, there is a chance that the error could be caused by the set up of Administrator. The Rule Base, therefore, should be audited against what has been designed.

### Current State of Practice

In this research, the Audit Program is derived from Checkpoint Firewall Audit work Program by Terry Cavender. ([terry.cavender@Vanderbilt.Edu](mailto:terry.cavender@Vanderbilt.Edu), [www.auditnet.org/docs/CheckpointFirewall.txt](http://www.auditnet.org/docs/CheckpointFirewall.txt))

According to the questions of this Assignment:

- Why are current methods and techniques in need of improvement?
- What can be measured objectively?
- What must be measured subjectively? and
- How do you know when a system is out of specs?

In respond to the above questions, it can be classified into three criteria.

1. Improvement Needed
2. Objective Measurement
3. Subjective Measurement
4. Criteria

## FIREWALL LOGICAL ACCESS

STANDARD: Logical access to the various components (routers, firewall software) of the firewall solution is appropriately restricted to the individuals with an authorized need for such access.

1. Determine the individuals who have log in capability to the firewall components are appropriate.

**Improvement Needed :** The unnecessary accounts should be also included in the checklists.

**Objective Measurement :**

- By running "more /etc/passwd" command on Solaris

Sample Output

```
root:x:0:1:"Root at noah":/root:/sbin/sh
daemon:x:1:1:::/sbin/noshell
bin:x:2:2::/usr/bin:/sbin/noshell
sys:x:3:3:::/sbin/noshell
adm:x:4:4:Admin:/var/adm:/sbin/noshell
lp:x:71:8:Line Printer Admin:/usr/spool/lp:/sbin/noshell
uucp:x:5:5:uucp Admin:/usr/lib/uucp:/sbin/noshell
nuucp:x:9:9:uucp Admin:/var/spool/uucppublic:/sbin/noshell
```

/sbin/noshell : This account have no shell , can not login . It is not user's account.

/sbin/sh : This account can login with the according shell type. It is user's account.

**Subjective Measurement :**

- After get user's account lists from objective measurement, it is needed to be determined which individual is the owner of the account and the job description of owner is appropriate or not.
- Obtain list of users who have log in capability then compare against current access authorization.

**Criteria :**

- Document of authorized users must exist.
- Current access authorization must not be against with document.
- Existing account must be only necessary for Firewall , whether they have login capability or not.

2. Determine password management features in place for the applicable firewall components and the shadow password file (etc/security/password) is used.

**Improvement Needed :** N/A

**Objective Measurement :** By running these following commands

```
# more /etc/default/passwd
# passwd -s XXXX
```

Sample output

```
# more /etc/default/passwd
# $Id: passwd,v 1.2 2000/03/15 06:29:14 chouanar Exp $
# Added by Titan defpwparams.sh on 200011292015
```

```
MINWEEKS=1
MAXWEEKS=13
WARNWEEKS=4
PASSELENGTH=20
```

```
# passwd -s XXXX
XXXX PS 07/19/01 7 91 28
# passwd -s YYYY
YYYY PS 06/29/01 7 91 28
```

### Subjective Measurement:

- Obtain password management policy and compare against current password management features.

### Criteria:

- Password management policy must exist.
- Current password management features must not be against with password management policy.
- These guidelines for password management policy should be applied.

3. Determine logical connections to the firewall components are secured, e.g., encryption, IP restrictions for remote administration needs. Products such as ssh (encryption connection) and TCP wrappers (IP restrictions) may be appropriate. If TCP wrappers are used determine if the reverse look up (paranoid) option was activated (compiled). Second, determine if the advance configuration is used. This configuration keeps all the binaries in their original locations, which may be critical for future patches.

**Improvement Needed :** N/A

### Objective Measurement :

Check whether Secured Shell running, use this command to obtain running process from host.

```
# ps -ef | grep sshd
```

Check whether Secured Shell running, use this command to obtain running process from host.

```
# pkginfo | grep tcp_wrappers
```

Check configuration of TCP Wrapper that restrict connection to firewall. Obtain host allow and host deny list on the server with the following commands.

```
# more /etc/hosts.deny
# more /etc/hosts.allow
```

4. Review for dial in access directly to the firewall server.

**Improvement Needed :** N/A

**Objective Measurement :** N/A

### Subjective Measurement :

- Obtain list of users who have dial in capability then compare against current access authorization

### Criteria :

- If dial in to firewall is allowed:
- List of users who have dial in capability must be documented.
  - Current access authorization must compile with the policy.

5. Are modems automatically disconnected by the system after a specified length of time of inactivity? After connection is broken?

**Improvement Needed :** N/A

**Objective Measurement :**

- Dial in to firewall and leave session inactivity for a period of time and see if it is automatically disconnected.

**Subjective Measurement :** N/A

**Criteria :**

If dial in to firewall is allowed:

- Modem must be disconnected automatically after ..... minutes of inactivity and after connection is broken.

## **FIREWALL CONFIGURATION**

**STANDARD:** The firewall configuration in place provides for an adequately maintained and effective firewall. Repeat each step as applicable for each firewall component.

1. Determine the firewall component logical/physical locations agree with the firewall strategy.

**Improvement Needed :** N/A

**Objective Measurement :** N/A

**Subjective Measurement :**

- Determine the physical location whether there is a appropriate protection of physical access such as location of server, location of data center, network, UPS, fire Suppression system, air conditioning system.
- Document and evaluate controls over potential access paths into the system to assess their adequacy, efficiency and effectiveness.

**Criteria:**

The following items must exist,

1. Secured Firewall Location, Physical network port.
2. Authenticated physical access
3. UPS
4. Fire Suppression System
5. Air Conditioner
6. Physical separation of network segment.

2. Determine the firewall components are on the latest possible version and security patches are current. Application of security patches - Is there a patch ID that equates to a certain level of applied patches. Expect patches to be applied bi-weekly, if less why.

**Improvement Needed :** N/A

**Objective Measurement :**

**Solaris :**

- The latest official Patch from Sun Microsystem can be found at <http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-access>
- Besides, there is a Perl script for verify the patch "patchchk" which can be downloaded from <ftp://sunsolve.sun.com/pub/patches/patchdiag.xref>

Procedure:

At console of Solaris running theses commands

```
showrev -p > srp1
```

```
pkginfo -l > pil1
```

```
perl patchchk -p pil1 srp1 <os> <arch> [<name>]
```

### Sample Output

#### INSTALLED PATCHES

Patch ID	Installed Revision	Latest Revision	Synopsis
----------	--------------------	-----------------	----------

106327	08	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: Shared library patch for C++
106541	12	16	SunOS 5.7: Kernel update patch
106793	05	07	SunOS 5.7: ufsdump and ufsrestore patch
106924	02	06	SunOS 5.7: isp driver patch
106925	02	07	SunOS 5.7: glm driver patch
106936	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /etc/cron.d/logchecker patch
106938	04	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: libresolv patch
106940	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/makedbm patch

**Firewall 1 :** The Firewall 1 Latest bug report can be found at [www.securityfocus.com](http://www.securityfocus.com) in BugTraq Section (please see detail in Appendix A.)

a) Running command : fwver -K

### Sample Output

This is Check Point VPN-1(TM) & FireWall-1(R) Version 4.1 Build 41814 [VPN + DES]  
kernel: Version 4.1 [VPN + DES] Build 41814

**Subjective Measurement :** N/A

#### **Criteria :**

For Solaris OS, it needs to be verified as the following;

1. How many patches are not in the "Current" status.
2. How many "out-of-date" patches are security related patches.

For Firewall-1

1. Compare actual running version against the vulnerable versions in appendix A.

3. Determine the security administrator solicits to Bugtraq and/others to be notified of the latest bugs and exploits.

**Improvement Needed:** N/A

**Objective Measurement:** N/A

#### **Subjective Measurement:**

- Obtaining list of sources of information from administrators.
- Obtaining the bugs, exploit report last 3 months
- Verifying consistent of information form the sources versus the report.

#### **Criteria :**

- If there are sources of information, there must be evidences showing that the information had been reviewed

4. Identify the installation cluster used (core, end user, developer, entire distribution). Anything above end user should be explained, such as Developer, is adding potentially exploitable software (compile libraries).

**Improvement Needed:**

- Firewall Server should be dedicated. Therefore any cluster that is not involved with Firewall's function should not be installed.

**Objective Measurement:**

- Verify current installed package by running "pkginfo" command on the Solaris console.

Sample Output

```
# pkginfo
application CPdtm-41      Check Point Policy Server
application CPFw1-41     Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
application CPgui-41     Check Point FireWall-1 GUI
system      GNUgzip      GNU gzip
system      GNUrcs       GNU rcs and diffutils
application IZzip        zip
system      PARCdaily   DailyCronJob
system      PRFtripw    tripwire
system      SECclean    Solaris 2.6, 7 and 8 Security Cleanup
```

**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:**

Compare package list shown in the result with the recommended packages in appendix B.

5. Obtain the /etc/inetd.conf file. Ftp and Telnet should be the only active services. If others are present determine why. Confirm what you have commented out with the following command (this will show you all the services that were left uncommented) #grep -v "^#" /etc/inetd.conf.

**Improvement Needed :**

- Actually both Telnet and FTP services are unsecured, they should not be running on the Firewall.
- This measurement shall not be applicable

**Objective Measurement:** N/A

**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:** N/A

6. Obtain the /etc/rc2.d file. This file contains the startup scripts launched by the init(iation) process. Most of these are not needed. The following scripts are not needed and pose serious security threats:

/etc/rc2.d FILE

- \* S73nfs.client - used for NFS mounting a system. A firewall should never mount another file system.
- \* S74autofs - used for auto-mounting, a firewall should never mount another file system.
- \* S80lp - used for printing, your firewall should never need to print.
- \* S88sendmail - listens for incoming email. Your system can still send mail (such as alerts) with this disabled.
- \* S71rpc - portmapper daemon, a highly insecure service (required if you are running CDE).
- \* S99dtlogin - CDE daemon, starts CDE by default (GUI interface).

**Improvement Needed:** N/A

**Objective Measurement:**

Running following command on Solaris console.



**# ls /etc/rc3.d**

**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:**

The mentioned scripts should not be found on the file .

7. Obtain the /etc/rc3.d file. More startup scripts launched by the init process are contained within. Two of these scripts are not needed.

/etc/rc3.d

\* S15nfs.server - used to share file systems, which should not be done with firewalls.

\* S76snmpdx - snmp daemon

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:**

Running following command on Solaris console

**# ls /etc/rc2.d**

**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:** The mentioned scripts should not be found on the file

8. If the following files are not present on the system request that they be created:  
\* The file /etc/issue. This file will be an ASCII text banner that appears for all telnet logins . This legal warning will appear whenever someone attempts to login to your system.

\* The file /etc/ftpusers. Any account listed in this file cannot ftp to the system. This restricts common system accounts, such as root or bin, from attempting ftp sessions. The following command should create this file:

cat /etc/passwd | cut -f1 -d: > /etc/ftpusers

**Improvement Needed:**N/A .

**Objective Measurement:**

**# ls -al /etc/issue ftpusers**

**# more /etc/issue**

**# more /etc/ftpusers**

**Subjective Measurement:**

- Consider the appropriateness of the content in the banner.

**Criteria:**

- File should exist and contains proper legal warning.

9. Determine that root cannot telnet to the system. This forces administrators to login to the system as themselves and then su to root. This is a system default, but always confirm this in the file /etc/default/login, where the console command (console=/dev/console) is left uncommented.

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:**

Running following command,

**# more /etc/default/login | grep CONSOLE**

**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:**

The CONSOLE should be set to ensure that root can only login from console.

10. Determine the telnet OS banner has been eliminated and suggest creating a separate banner for ftp. For telnet, create the file /etc/default/telnetd and adding the statement:

```
BANNER="" # Eliminates the "SunOS 5.6" banner for Telnet
```

For ftp, create the file /etc/default/ftpd and add the statement:

```
BANNER="WARNING:Authorized use only" # Warning banner for ftp.
```

**Improvement Needed:**

- Actually both Telnet and FTP services are unsecured, they should not be running on the Firewall.
- This measurement shall not applicable

**Objective Measurement:**

```
# more /etc/default/telnetd | Grep BANNER
```

```
# more /etc/default/ftpd | Grep BANNER
```

**Subjective Measurement:**

- Consider the appropriateness of the content in the banner.

**Criteria:**

- File should exist and contains proper legal warning.

11. Determine if there are any compilers on the Solaris box and the need. Generally there should not be any compilers.

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:**

```
# pkginfo
```

**Subjective Measurement:**

**Criteria:**

Compiler package can be found on the 3<sup>rd</sup> column in the "pkginfo" command result. The required compiler for Firewall-1 is only SUNWlibC SPARCompilers Bundled libC. Others compiler is not necessary and considers as a inappropriateness

12. Determine if these files: .rhosts, .netrc, and /etc/hosts.equiv are secured. The r commands use these files to access systems. To lock them down, touch the files, then change the permissions to zero. This way no one can create or alter the files. For example,

```
/usr/bin/touch /.rhosts /.netrc /etc/hosts.equiv
```

```
/usr/bin/chmod 0 /.rhosts /.netrc /etc/hosts.equiv
```

**Improvement Needed:**

-Any remote services should not allowed on the Firewall , this measurement would rather check whether rlogin and other "r" services are running by checking the etc/inetd.conf.

**Objective Measurement:**

```
# ls -al /.rhosts /.netrc /etc/hosts.equiv
```

**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

### Criteria:

13. Determine if the TCP initial sequence number generation parameters is randomized. This is done by setting TCP\_STRONG\_ISS=2 in the file /etc/default/inetinit.

#### Improvement Needed:

#### Objective Measurement:

```
# more /etc/default/inetinit | grep TCP_STRING_ISS=
```

#### Subjective Measurement: N/A

#### Criteria:

If TCP\_STRONG\_ISS parameter is set to 1, it considers as not secure. There is risk of ISN predictable and spoofed packets

14. Determine if the following lines are in /etc/system:

```
set noexec_user_stack=1
```

```
set noexec_user_stack_log=1
```

The settings protect against possible buffer overflow (or stack smashing) attacks.

#### Improvement Needed:

#### Objective Measurement:

```
# more /etc/system | Grep noexec_user_stack
```

[Sample Output](#)

```
set noexec_user_stack = 1
```

```
set noexec_user_stack_log = 1
```

#### Subjective Measurement: N/A

#### Criteria :

-The buffer overflow attack is a high risk, if there is no parameters setting for protect the OS. It is considerable as unsecured.

15. The rpc.cmsd subsystem of OpenWindows/CDE has been identified as a security risk. This daemon is required for the GUI interface. RPC.CMSD DAEMON should be removed.

**Improvement Needed:** The RPC service contains a lot of vulnerabilities and it is well known threat. It must be totally disabled from Firewall by getting of the portmapper services in the "rc" and the "inetd.conf".

#### Objective Measurement:

```
# ps -ef | grep rpc.cmsd
```

[Sample output](#)

```
daemon 8597 8588 0 14:42:09 pts/9 0:00 /usr/dt/bin/rpc.cmsd
```

```
root 8599 8588 0 14:42:29 pts/9 0:00 grep rpc.cmsd
```

#### Subjective Measurement: N/A

#### Criteria:

- If there is RPC process running on the Firewall, the output from the command will showing as indicate in the sample output.

16. Determine if the following commands have been placed in one of the start up scripts for the IP module:

```
### Set kernel parameters for /dev/ip
```

```
ndd -set /dev/ip ip_respond_to_echo_broadcast 0
nnd -set /dev/ip ip_forward_directed_broadcasts 0
nnd -set /dev/ip ip_respond_to_timestamp 0
nnd -set /dev/ip ip_respond_to_timestamp_broadcast 0
nnd -set /dev/ip ip_forward_src_routed 0
nnd -set /dev/ip ip_ignore_redirect 1
```

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:**

### Command and Sample output

```
# nnd -get /dev/ip ip_respond_to_echo_broadcast
0
# nnd -get /dev/ip ip_forward_directed_broadcasts
0
# nnd -get /dev/ip ip_respond_to_timestamp
0
# nnd -get /dev/ip ip_respond_to_timestamp_broadcast
0
```

**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:**

Result form running each command "0" is mean , it already running in the system.

### O/S LOGS

17. Obtain the firewall operating system configuration (/etc/syslog.conf) for rejection and logging of activities.

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:**

# more /etc/syslog.conf

**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:**

- From the result of the command , review the content in log file and find out security related activities such as, Unauthorized login , drop are rejected packets, daemon startup and terminated.
- Obtain the report of the response to suspects activities .

18. Document the logging results are monitored and follow up actions is performed.

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:** N/A

**Subjective Measurement:**

- Obtain the report of logging review.
- Verify whether any errors on log had been fixed.

**Criteria:**

- If there is no evidence showing the activities , it assumable that there is no action performed.
- 

19. Determine how the system and firewall logs are rotated to reduce disk space problems. Rotation should be automatic. Document how long they are kept.

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:** N/A

**Subjective Measurement:**

- Obtain the procedure of logs rotation.
- Obtain the report of logs backup.
- Obtains the media of backup and according report.

**Criteria:**

- There must be backup equipment, process, procedure and documents.

20. Checkpoint FireWall-1 comes with several ports open (default), such as 256, 257, and 258, and ICMP service. These ports are for administration, and found in the control properties. They should disable and rules in the database established to allow access to the server.

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:**

- Running this command to obtain current allowed client .  
# \$FWDIR/bin/cpconfig
- Open Firewall-1 Administration client and review current rule base.

**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:**

The client IP address will be showing in the output, verify that it is consistent with the authorized administrator clients.

**TEST THE FIREWALL**

21. Attempt to port scan the firewall(s), from both the internal network and the Internet, scanning for ICMP, UDP and TCP. There should be no open ports and should not be able to ping it.


**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:**

Procedure


Inbound Scan

- Install Nmap's machine at the external network
- Fill in Nmap with the IP address of Firewall the Nmap parameter should be as followed  
Nmap -v -g53 -P0 -SA -T Aggressive FirewallAddress ( For TCP)
- Running Nmap Scan
- Compare scanning result with the Firewall's port in Appendix C.



### Outbound Scan

- a). Install Nmap's machine at the external network
- b). Do the same as Inbound scan



**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:**

- Compare the result with the expected opened ports on Firewall in Appendix C.

## REVIEW & TEST THE RULE BASE DESIGN

22. Determine a lockdown rule has been placed at the beginning of the rule base. The lockdown rule protects the firewall, ensuring that whatever other rules you put in later will not inadvertently compromise your firewall. If administrative access is required then a rule should be placed before the lockdown rule. All other rules should go after the lockdown rule going from most restrictive to general rules. Review the remaining rules.

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:**

- Running Firewall Administration Client to obtain current rule base setting.

[Screen shot.](#)

No.	Source	Destination	Service	Action	Track	Install On	Time
1	suspend-10.15.12.51 suspend-10.15.31.33	Any	Any	drop		Gateways	Any
2	Any	noah INTERNAL net203.146.64.0	NET	drop		Gateways	Any

**Subjective Measurement:**

**Criteria:** The action in the first rule must be "drop", Source and Destination must be appropriate setting.


23. Obtain and review the connections table for time out limits and number of connections.

**Improvement Needed:**

### Objective Measurement:

For determine connection time out.

- Running Firewall Administration Client to obtain current rule base setting .



For determin connection limitation,

- Running `"more table.def | grep "hashsize" "` command

### Subjective Measurement: N/A

#### Criteria:

-The high TCP Session Time out setting will lead the high risk from being Denial of Services by fill connection table. Consider the appropriate time out according to the nature of traffics (900 sec is recommend)

- The actual connection limitation will appear in the result of the "more..." command, Consider the appropriate limitation according to the nature of traffics (50,000 connection is recommend)


24. Attempt to test the rulebase by scanning secured network segments from other network segments.

#### Improvement Needed:

#### Objective Measurement:

##### Procedure

- Install Nmap's machine at the external network.
- Select a host in internal network to be target of the scan.
- Determine the rulebase that control traffic to that host and created expected result from ther rulebase.
- Fill in Nmap with the IP address of Firewall the Nmap parameter should be as followed  
`Nmap -v -g53 -P0 -SA -T Aggressive TargetHostAddress ( For TCP)`
- Running Nmap Scan



**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:**

- Compare the scanning result with the predetermined expected result, it must be the consistent result. There might be something wrong either rulebase design or firewall itself.


25. Identify accessible resources behind the firewall that are to be encrypted and determine the connections are encrypted. This may entail using a sniffer to capture log in data to the firewall and traffic going through the firewall.

**Improvement Needed:**


**Objective Measurement:**

- Running FW-1 Admin client, check the workstation properties which is using encryption.
- Put the TCPdump host to sniff the packets in-out the selected workstation
- Try to running "clear text" application such as Telnet within to that workstation.

[Sample screen shots.](#)







**Subjective Measurement:** N/A

**Criteria:**

- If the traffic are encrypted the results from the sniffer must be unreadable.

26. Determine if there is a change control process in place for the rule base.

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:** N/A

**Subjective Measurement:**

- Obtain Change Control Policy
- Verify if the following information is included in the rule:
  - \* Name of person modifying rule
  - \* Date/time of rule change
  - \* Reason for rule change.
- Reconcile change control record against the current rule base.

**Criteria:**


- The reconcile results must be consistent.

27. Determine the use of the firewall's automatic notification/alerting features and archiving the detail intruder information to a database for future analysis.

**Improvement Needed:**

**Objective Measurement:**

- Running Firewall Administration Client to obtain current rule base setting .



- Determine alert condition, testing simulated condition and checking the alert result .

### Subjective Measurement:

- Determine the alert condition is practical and appropriate.

### Criteria:

- The alert command must be properly set in the Firewall set up,
- There must be alert in simulation test.

## FIREWALL APPLICATION LOGS

28. A separate partition for the firewall logging should be considered. For Checkpoint Firewall 1, all logging by default happens in /etc/fw/log and /var/opt/CKPfw/log for ver 4.0. Expect to see a second drive. If its not mirrored suggest using it for firewall logging.

### Improvement Needed:

#### Objective Measurement:

```
# df -k |grep /var/opt/CPfw1-41/log
/dev/dsk/c0t1d0s0 8705501 3242616 5375830 38% /var/opt/CPfw1-41/log
```

### # df -k

Filesystem	kbytes	used	avail	capacity	Mounted on
/proc	0	0	0	0%	/proc
/dev/dsk/c0t0d0s0	5602359	329103	5217233	6%	/
fd	0	0	0	0%	/dev/fd
/dev/dsk/c0t0d0s3	1018382	78793	878487	9%	/var
/dev/dsk/c0t0d0s4	1018382	46970	910310	5%	/export/home
/dev/dsk/c0t1d0s0	8705501	3242616	5375830	38%	/var/opt/CPfw1-41/log
swap	102400	24	102376	1%	/tmp

**Subjective Measurement :** N/A

**Criteria :** N/A

### Additional Checklist


\*\*\*\* The additional Checklist is recommended by Author which are not part of original checklist.

1. Vulnerability Scanning, Vulnerability Scanning is to scan the vulnerability cause by installed configuration or administration of the OS itself. The tool for auditing is "Nessus" version 1.8 which can get from [www.nessus.org](http://www.nessus.org) and customize plugins for scanning the Solaris and Firewall 1 as shown in the Appendix D.

### **Objective Measurement:**

#### Procedures

- Install Nessus on Linux machine to be scanner
- Config plugins to scan only Solaris & Firewall-1 Vulnerabilities and Denial of service as show in Appendix D.
- Connect Nessus machine to Firewall
- Perform Solaris scanning by Nessus
- Get the scanning result after scanning finish.



**Subjective Measurement:** N/A


**Criteria:** The scanning result from Nessus should not found any vulnerabilities remain on the Solaris and it should still be able to running as usual after being Denial of Services attacked from Nessus.

2. Spoofed Address Filtering Spoofed packets is intrusion technique which widely uses by hacker. So, Firewall must be configured properly to protect internal network from such technique.


### **Objective Measurement:**

#### Procedures

- a). Discover network diagram , obtain valid IP and invalid IP address for each network .
- b). Install Lcrzoex to be packet generator .
- c). Install TCP Dump as a sniffer to detect scanning packets from Lcrzoex
- d). Select destination host in internal network that allow inbound packets pass through firewall.
- e). Install sniffer in the same segment with target's host .
- e). Connect Lcrzoex's machine to external network
- f). Running Lcrzoex to generate packet contain Invalid source IP Address to target host with the allowed port.
- g). Record the result of scanning on TCPdump host



- h). Select destination host in external network.
- i). Install sniffer in the same segment with target's host.
- j). Connect Lcrzoex's machine to internal network.
- k). Config Firewall's rulebase to allow outbound packets form Lcrzoex 's host.
- l). Running Lcrzoex to generate packet contain Invalid source IP Address to target host.
- m). Record the result of scanning on TCPdump host.



## Output

.....

### Criteria

Spoofer IP address packets should be dropped at firewall in any interface regardless to the rulebase.


### 3. Broadcast Address Filtering

Broadcast packets always be used to Denial of Services or network enumeration such as Smurf Attack , Network Scanning Firewall must be configured properly to protect internal network from such packets.


#### Objective Measurement

##### Procedures

- Install Lacroex on External network
- Select host in the internal network to be target of scanning
- Install sniffer ( TCPDump ) machine in the same segment with target host and can sniff any in-out packets from the target host .
- Running Lacroex to generate packet **to** broadcast address located in internal network , the command and parameters will be
- Record the result of scan packets detected at TCP Dump.



- Running Lacroex to generate packet **from** broadcast address located in external network, the command and parameters will be
- Record the result of scan packets detected at TCP Dump.



## Subjective Measurement

.....

### Criteria


**There should no broadcast address packets traverse through Firewall either incoming or outgoing.**

## 4.Port Scanning with Firewalk

There are various techniques to penetrate the firewall. Almost (of) all Firewalls can block directed scanning such as SYN scan or FIN Scan. However the new technique always developed, using TTL is an example of advanced scanning technique. Firewalk is the Firewall scanning tools that apply TTL technique to scanning host behind Firewall.

\*\*\* Program Firewalk can be searched from <http://www.packetfactory.net/Projects/Firewalk/> Authors Mike D. Schiffman and David E. Goldsmith  
**Objective Measurement.**  
[Procedures](#)

- a) Install Firewalk's machine at the external network
- b) Select the target host to be scanned from Internal network
- c) Create expected scanning result from the Rule Base that relate to target host.1
- d) Fill in Firewalk with the IP address of Firewall and Target
- e) Running Firewalk Scan
- f) Compare scanning result with the expected result



**Subjective Measurement : N/A**

**Criteria :**

Scanning result should not different from any scanning. If there are rules to block certain type of services, Firewall should block all traffic regardless which protocol are using.

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## Part 2. Application of Audit Technique to a Real World System

### Conduct and Evaluate the Audit

\*\* From the full audit checklist in assignment 1, there are 11 tests have been selected as a sample of this assignment.

1. Determine the individuals who have log in capability to the firewall components are appropriate.

#### **Result:**

```
# more /etc/passwd
root:x:0:1:"Root at noah":/root:/sbin/sh
daemon:x:1:1:/:/sbin/noshell
bin:x:2:2:/:usr/bin:/sbin/noshell
sys:x:3:3:/:/sbin/noshell
adm:x:4:4:Admin:/var/adm:/sbin/noshell
lp:x:71:8:Line Printer Admin:/usr/spool/lp:/sbin/noshell
uucp:x:5:5:uucp Admin:/usr/lib/uucp:/sbin/noshell
nuucp:x:9:9:uucp Admin:/var/spool/uucppublic:/sbin/noshell
listen:x:37:4:Network Admin:/usr/net/nls:/sbin/noshell
nobody:x:60001:60001:Nobody:/:/sbin/noshell
noaccess:x:60002:60002:No Access User:/:/sbin/noshell
nobody4:x:65534:65534:SunOS 4.x Nobody:/:/sbin/noshell
thirada:x:101:101:/:export/home/thirada:/bin/ksh
patrol:x:102:101:/:export/home/patrol:/sbin/noshell
```

#### **Evaluation :**

There is only user "thirada" can log in to this Firewall. With the information obtain from organization chart , he is firewall administrator, therefore it is appropriate assignment.

However ,ther are a lot of unnecessary accounts found ( lp, uucp, nuucp, listen, patrol). These accounts must be removed. It is considerable as a inappropriate administration.

2. Determine logical connections to the firewall components are secured, e.g., encryption, IP restrictions for remote administration needs.

#### **Result:**

```
#ps -ef |grep sshd
root    29277      422    0 11:48:45 ?        0:01 /usr/local/sbin/sshd
root    422        1    0   Jul 10 ?        0:00 /usr/local/sbin/sshd
root    29435    29304    0 11:52:56 pts/0    0:00 grep  sshd
#pkginfo |grep tcp_wrappers
system          Wvtcpd          [Wiets Venema] tcp_wrappers
# more /etc/hosts.deny
ALL: ALL
# more /etc/hosts.allow
sshd: 10.15.14.4 10.15.14.28
```

#### **Evaluation:**



The "Secured Shell" and "TCP Wrappers" are found on the Firewall. There are restriction found in "hosts.deny" , this is evidence of restriction and encryption have been applied to this host.

**3.** Determine the firewall components are on the latest possible version and security patches are current. Application of security patches - Is there a patch ID that equates to a certain level of applied patches. Expect patches to be applied bi-weekly, if less why.

**For Check Point Firewall-1**

**Result :**

```
# fw ver -k
This is Check Point VPN-1(TM) & FireWall-1(R) Version 4.1 Build 41862 [VPN + DES]
kernel: Version 4.1 [VPN + DES] Build 41862
# █
```

**Evaluation:**

The current version of this Firewall is "Check Point VPN-1 & Firewall-1 Version 4.1 Build 41862 [VPN+DES]". This version is the latest and not vulnerable.

**For Solaris 2.7**

**Result:**

```
# perl ./patchk.pl -p pill srp1 5.7 sparc noah -x patchdiag.xref > result.txt
```

---



---

**INSTALLED PATCHES**

Patch Installed Latest Synopsis  
ID Revision Revision

Patch ID	Installed Revision	Latest Revision	Synopsis
106327	08	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: Shared library patch for C++
106541	12	16	SunOS 5.7: Kernel update patch
106793	05	07	SunOS 5.7: ufsdump and ufsrestore patch
106924	02	06	SunOS 5.7: isp driver patch
106925	02	07	SunOS 5.7: glm driver patch
106936	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /etc/cron.d/logchecker patch
106938	04	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: libresolv patch
106940	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/makedbm patch
106942	07	17	SunOS 5.7: libnsl, rpc.nisd and nis_cachemgr patch
106944	03	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /kernel/fs/fifofs and /kernel/fs/sparcv9/fifofs patch
106948	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /kernel/drv/qe and /kernel/drv/sparcv9/qe patch
106950	13	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: Linker patch
106960	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: Manual Pages for patchadd.1m and patchrm.1m
106963	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /kernel/drv/esp and /kernel/drv/sparcv9/esp patch
106978	10	11	SunOS 5.7: sysid patch
106980	07	16	SunOS 5.7: libthread patch
106982	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /kernel/drv/fas and /kernel/drv/sparcv9/fas patch
106985	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/uadmin and /sbin/uadmin patch
106987	02	03	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/tar patch
107018	02	03	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/in.named patch
107038	01	02	SunOS 5.7: apropos/catman/man/whatis patch
107059	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/bin/sort and /usr/xpg4/bin/sort patch
107147	05	08	Obsoleted by: 106541-14 SunOS 5.7: pci driver patch
107148	04	08	SunOS 5.7: /kernel/fs/cacheofs patch
107171	06	08	SunOS 5.7: Fixes for patchadd and patchrm
107185	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: Miscellaneous Russian KOI8-R problems
107187	01	02	SunOS 5.7: Miscellaneous Eastern European locale problems
107285	02	03	SunOS 5.7: passwd & pam library patch
107316	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: localeconv() returns wrong results for French
107330	01	02	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/ntpdate patch
107332	02	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: libadm patch
107401	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/bin/iostat patch

107403	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: rmod & telmod patch
107432	03	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: CTL printing patch
107441	01	02	SunOS 5.7: /usr/bin/mailx patch
107443	12	13	SunOS 5.7: packaging utilities patch
107448	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/lib/fs/cachefs/cachefsd patch
107451	05	06	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/cron patch
107453	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: Ultra-80 platform patch
107454	05	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/bin/ftp patch
107456	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /etc/nsswitch.dns patch
107458	04	13	SunOS 5.7: dad, sd, ssd, uata kernel drivers patch
107459	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: qec driver patch
107460	03	09	SunOS 5.7: st driver patch
107462	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /kernel/sched/TS patch
107465	02	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /kernel/fs/hsfs and /kernel/fs/sparcv9/hsfs patch
107474	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: ifp adb macro patch
107475	01	02	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/in.telnetd patch
107477	02	03	SunOS 5.7: /usr/lib/nfs/mountd patch
107544	03	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/lib/fs/ufs/fsck patch
107551	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/bin/date and /usr/xpg4/bin/date patch
107589	03	06	SunOS 5.7: se, zs, kbd and kbio.h patch
107624	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/lib/fs/ufs/df patch
107680	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /kernel/sys/msgsys and /kernel/sys/sparcv9/msgsys patch
107738	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: Estonian locale uses incorrect codeset (QU)
107744	01	02	SunOS 5.7: /usr/bin/du and /usr/xpg4/bin/du patch
107746	03	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: Croatian locale hr_HR corrections
107792	02	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/bin/pax patch
107796	01	03	SunOS 5.7: /kernel/fs/lofs patch
107799	01	02	SunOS 5.7: compress/uncompress/zcat patch
107809	03		
107836	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/format patch
107841	01	03	SunOS 5.7: rpcsec patch
107843	02	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /sbin/init and /usr/sbin/init patch
107865	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /kernel/sys/shmsys patch
108068	03	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: Manual Page updates for Solaris 7
108089	02	03	SunOS 5.7: /usr/bin/tail patch
108148	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: prtconf patch
108158	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/lib/fs/nfs/share patch
108162	01	03	SunOS 5.7: jsh, rsh, sh patch
108170	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: showrev patch
108175	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: DSR Upgrade patch for localization packages
108203	01	05	SunOS 5.7: adb macro & headers for fibre channel transport layer
108224	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: envctrl driver patch
108244	01	02	SunOS 5.7: libaio patch
108263	01	07	SunOS 5.7: hme driver patch
108285	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /etc/init.d/MOUNTFSYS patch
108301	02	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/in.tftpd patch
108482	02	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/sbin/snoop patch
108662	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: Patch for sadmind
108798	01	02	SunOS 5.7: /usr/bin/tip patch
108838	02	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: allocate/mkdevmaps/mkdevalloc patch
109104	04	CURRENT	Obsoleted by: 106541-14 SunOS 5.7: /kernel/fs/sockfs patch
109253	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/bin/mail patch
109744	01	CURRENT	SunOS 5.7: /usr/lib/nfs/nfsd patch

### Evaluation:

There are total 85 patches found on this server , 50 patches are the latest patches , 35 are out-of-date patches .

Some out-of-date patches are security related and need to be installed.

**4.** Identify the installation cluster used (core, end user, developer, entire distribution). Anything above end user should be explained, such as Developer, is adding potentially exploitable software (compile libraries).

### Result :

```

# pkginfo
application CPdtm-41      Check Point Policy Server
application CPFw1-41     Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
application CPgui-41     Check Point Firewall-1 GUI
system      GNUgzip      GNU gzip
system      GNUrcs       GNU rcs and diffutils
application IZzip       zip
system      PARCdaily    DailyCronJob
system      PRFtripw     tripwire
system      SECclean     Solaris 2.6, 7 and 8 Security Cleanup
application SMCgzip     gzip
application SMCunzip    unzip
system      SUNWadmc     System administration core libraries
system      SUNWadmfw    System & Network Administration Framework
system      SUNWcar      Core Architecture, (Root)
system      SUNWcsd      Core Solaris Devices
system      SUNWcsl      Core Solaris, (Shared Libs)
system      SUNWcsr      Core Solaris, (Root)
system      SUNWcsu      Core Solaris, (Usr)
system      SUNWdfb      Dumb Frame Buffer Device Drivers
system      SUNWdoc      Documentation Tools
system      SUNWesu      Extended System Utilities
system      SUNWhmd      SunSwift SBus Adapter Drivers
system      SUNWkey      Keyboard configuration tables
system      SUNWkvm      Core Architecture, (Kvm)
system      SUNWlibC     SPARCompilers Bundled libc
system      SUNWlibms    Sun WorkShop Bundled shared libm
system      SUNWloc      System Localization
system      SUNWman      On-Line Manual Pages
system      SUNWntpu     NTP, (Usr)
system      SUNWos86u    Platform Support, OS Functionality (Usr)
system      SUNWpd       PCI Drivers
system      SUNWploc     Partial Locales
system      SUNWploc1    Supplementary Partial Locales
system      SUNWqfed     Sun Quad FastEthernet Adapter 32bit Driver
system      SUNWscpu     Source Compatibility, (Usr)
system      SUNWswmt     Install and Patch Utilities
system      SUNWter      Terminal Information
system      SUNWudfr     Universal Disk Format 1.50
system      TSIfxdrv     GFX drivers for Solaris 2 (v2.1)
system      WVTcpd       [Wietse Venema] tcp_wrappers
#

```

### Evaluation:

Comparing result with the Firewall-1 required packages ,there are only additional 3 packages ( GNUgzip ,GNUrcs , Izzips) found . However these packages are essential utilities, and acceptable.

**5.** Determine that root cannot telnet to the system. This forces administrators to login to the system as themselves and then su to root.

#### Result:

```
# more /etc/default/login |grep CONSOLE
CONSOLE=/dev/console
```

#### Evaluation:

The console device has been set properly.

**6.** Determine if the TCP initial sequence number generation parameters is randomized. This is done by setting TCP\_STRONG\_ISS=2 in the file /etc/default/inetinit.

#### Result:

```
# more /etc/default/inetinit |grep TCP_STRONG_ISS=2
```

TCP\_STRONG\_ISS=2

**Evaluation:**

The parameter has been configured properly.

7. CheckPoint FireWall-1 comes with several ports open (default), such as 256, 257, and 258, and ICMP service. These ports are for administration, and found in the control properties. They should disabled and rules in the data base established to allow access to the server.

**Result:**

```
# $FWDIR/bin/cpconfig  
Configuring GUI clients...
```

```
=====  
GUI clients are trusted hosts from which  
Administrators are allowed to log on to this Management Station  
using Windows/X-Motif GUI.  
you have selected the following hosts to be GUI clients:  
10.15.14.4  
10.15.14.28
```

- Review rule base screen shot from FW-1 admin client

No.	Source	Destination	Service	Action	Track	Install On
-	FW1 Host	FW1 Host	FW1	accept		Gateways
-	FW1 Host	FW1 Host	FW1_log	accept		Gateways
-	gui-clients	FW1 Management	FW1_mgmt	accept		Gateways
-	FloodGate-1 Host	FW1 Management	FW1_ela	accept		Gateways
-	Any	FW1 Host	FW1_topo	accept		Gateways
-	Any	FW1 Host	FW1_key	accept		Gateways
-	Any	FW1 Host	IKE	accept		Gateways
-	FW1 Host	Any	IKE	accept		Gateways
-	Any	Any	RDP	accept		Gateways

Implied rule base.

No.	Source	Destination	Service	Action	Track	Install On	Time	Cor
1	suspend- suspend-	Any	Any	drop		Gateways	Any	
2	Any	noah INTERNAL net	NBT	drop		Gateways	Any	
3	keh-pc2	noah	ssh FW1_lea	accept		Gateways	Any	
4	Upcountry Suapah president net noah ext-router	noah Upcountry president ext-router	echo-reply echo-request time-exceeded dest-unreach	accept		Gateways	Any	
5	Any		time-exceeded echo-reply dest-unreach	accept		Gateways	Any	
6		Any	echo-request time-exceeded	accept		Gateways	Any	
7	Any	noah	Any	drop		Gateways	Any	

Rule base.

### Evaluation:

- The result from testing showing that the Firewall configuration allowed only 2 IP address to be administration clients, these 2 IP addresses are belong to administrator.

- In the rule base review, there are 2 rule base are applied to the firewall,
  1. Implied rules , these are system rules that must be set in order to administrate firewall properly , these rules will be processed prior to normal rule base. There are rules specify to allow connection from administration client to connect to the Firewall.(Rule in line no.3)
  2. Normal rules , these are rules that set up by administrator to control traffic pass through Firewall. There are rules to control connection to the Firewall as following,

-No.2 : Drop all traffic from any hosts that using NBT services. **This rule is not necessary because it would be covered by Firewall lock down rule.**

-No.3 : Allow connection from 2 Gui clients using ssh and FW1\_lea services. **This rule is acceptable but must be first rule.**

-No.4 : Allow hosts to Ping to Firewall. **This rule is inappropriate, Firewall should not response to ICMP.**

No.7: Drop all traffic from any host to Firewall in any service. **This rule is Firewall lockdown rule it should be set before another rules , for this audit, it should be second rule.**

8. Attempt to port scan the firewall(s), from both internal network and the Internet, scanning for ICMP, UDP and TCP. There should be no open ports and should not be able to ping it.

### TCP scanning

```
[root@furies /root]# nmap -n -sS -sR -g53 -PO -O -t aggressive 10.15.0.14

Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA26 ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
Adding open port 265/tcp
Adding open port 264/tcp
Interesting ports on (10.15.0.14):
(The 1537 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
Port      State      Service (RPC)
113/tcp   closed    auth
264/tcp   open      bgmp
265/tcp   open      unknown
500/tcp   closed    isakmp
6699/tcp  closed    napster
20005/tcp closed    btx
22273/tcp closed    wnn6
22289/tcp closed    wnn6_Cn
22305/tcp closed    wnn6_Kr
22321/tcp closed    wnn6_Tw
22370/tcp closed    hpnpd

Remote operating system guess: Solaris 2.6 - 2.7 with tcp_strong_iss=2
Uptime 8.534 days (since Tue Jul 10 22:08:02 2001)
```

### UDP Scanning

```
[root@furies /root]# nmap -n -sU -sR -PO -O -t aggressive 10.15.0.14

Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA26 ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
Skipping host (10.15.0.14) due to host timeout

Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 300 seconds
[root@furies /root]#
```

### ICMP (Ping)

```

[root@furies /root]# ping -c 10 10.15.0.14
PING 10.15.0.14 (10.15.0.14) from 10.15.12.91 : 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.15.0.14: icmp_seq=0 ttl=254 time=932 usec
64 bytes from 10.15.0.14: icmp_seq=1 ttl=254 time=916 usec
64 bytes from 10.15.0.14: icmp_seq=2 ttl=254 time=854 usec
64 bytes from 10.15.0.14: icmp_seq=3 ttl=254 time=856 usec
64 bytes from 10.15.0.14: icmp_seq=4 ttl=254 time=938 usec
64 bytes from 10.15.0.14: icmp_seq=5 ttl=254 time=875 usec
64 bytes from 10.15.0.14: icmp_seq=6 ttl=254 time=932 usec
64 bytes from 10.15.0.14: icmp_seq=7 ttl=254 time=910 usec
64 bytes from 10.15.0.14: icmp_seq=8 ttl=254 time=928 usec
64 bytes from 10.15.0.14: icmp_seq=9 ttl=254 time=1.411 msec

--- 10.15.0.14 ping statistics ---
10 packets transmitted, 10 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/mdev = 0.854/0.955/1.411/0.156 ms
[root@furies /root]#

```

### Evaluation:

The result from TCP scanning showing that only port 264 and 265 are open, these ports are intentionally opened by for VPN services. The related rules can be found in rule number 7 and 8 or implied rules. This is all right.

The result from UDP scanning showing no UDP ports open.

The result from ICMP (ping) showing that Firewall response with icmp echo request. This is not secure to allow this type of packets and must be fixed. ICMP response will introduce another threats to Firewall.

**9.** Scan the vulnerability cause by installed inappropriate configuration or administration of the OS and Firewall itself. The tool for auditing is "Nessus" version 1.8 which can get from [www.nessus.org](http://www.nessus.org) and customize plugins for scanning the Solaris and Firewall 1 as shown in the Appendix D.

### Result:

```

=====
Scanned hosts:

```

Name	High	Low	Info
10.15.0.14	0	2	2

Host: 10.15.0.14

Open ports:

unknown (264/tcp)

unknown (265/tcp)

Service: unknown (264/tcp)

Severity: Low

The remote host seems to be a Checkpoint FW-1 running SecureRemote.

Letting attackers know that you are running FW-1 may enable them to focus their attack or will make them change their attack strategy.

You should not let this information leak out.

Furthermore, an attacker can perform a denial of service attack on the machine.

Solution:

Restrict access to this port from untrusted networks.

Risk Factor: Low  
For More Information:  
[http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/CheckPoint\\_FW1\\_SecureRemote\\_DoS.html](http://www.securiteam.com/securitynews/CheckPoint_FW1_SecureRemote_DoS.html)  
Service: general/tcp  
Severity: Low  
QueSO has found out that the remote host OS is  
\* Standard: Solaris 2.x, Linux 2.1.???, Linux 2.2, MacOS  
CVE : CAN-1999-0454

=====  
**Evaluation:**

Status of this Firewall from Nessus showing that there is only low risk on ports opened on the Firewall . There is no known vulnerabilities related to Solaris or Firewall-1 found.

**10. Spoofed Address Filtering** Spoofed packets is intrusion technique which widely uses by hacker. So, Firewall must be configured properly to protect internal network from such technique.

**Result:**

Running Lacroex to spoofed packets from internal host using external IP address as a source address . ( Firewall Rule allow all outbound traffic)

```
# lcrzoex 138 eth0 00:C0:4F:BC:83:44 00:03:6B:D0:EC:40 203.xx.xx.xx 203.yy.yy.yy 555 30  
Closing spoof (received : SIG2)  
Closing sniff (received : SIG2)  
Terminated
```

Result :

```
# tcpdump -ln ip dst host 203.yy.yy.yy and dst port 555  
Kernel filter, protocol ALL, datagram packet socket  
tcpdump: listening on all devices
```

0 packets received by filter

**Evaluation:**

There is no packets captured on TCPdump , Firewall could detect and drop all spoofed packets.

**11. Port Scanning with Firewalk**

There are various technique to penetrated the firewall. Almost of Firewall can block directed scanning such as SYN scan or FIN Scan. However the new technique always developed, using TTL is an efficient technique. Firewalk is the Firewall scanning tools that use technique.

**Result:**



```
[root@furies /root]# fwalk -S1-1024 -s53 -pTCP -T1 203.203. > /tmp/.fw.  
[root@furies /root]# grep ": open" /tmp/.fw.scan ;tail -2 /tmp/.fw.scan  
port 80: open  
port 443: open  
2 ports open, 0 ports unknown  
1027 probes sent, 5 replies received  
[root@furies /root]#
```

### **Evaluation:**

The result showing that Firewalk found 2 TCP ports open (80,443) that is for HTTP and HTTPS server. This result is consistent with the rule base that allow these 2 inbound services. But Firewalk did not found another ports on the server that actually also open such as SMTP, FTP, NetBIOS. It is ensure that Firewall can block port scanning using TTL technique.

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## Conclusion

Checklist	Pass	Fail
<b>1.</b> Determine the individuals who have log in capability to the firewall components are appropriate.		<b>X</b>
<b>2.</b> Determine logical connections to the firewall components are secured, e.g., encryption, IP restrictions for remote administration needs.	<b>X</b>	
<b>3.</b> Determine the firewall components are on the latest possible version and security patches are current.	<b>X</b>	
<b>4.</b> Identify the installation cluster used (core, end user, developer, entire distribution).		<b>X</b>
<b>5.</b> Determine that root cannot telnet to the system. This forces administrators to login to the system as themselves and then su to root.	<b>X</b>	
<b>6.</b> Determine if the TCP initial sequence number generation parameters is randomized.	<b>X</b>	
<b>7.</b> CheckPoint FireWall-1 comes with several ports open (default), such as 256, 257, and 258, and ICMP service. These ports are for administration, and found in the control properties. They should be disabled and rules in the data base established to allow access to the server.		<b>X</b>
<b>8.</b> Attempt to port scan the firewall(s), from both internal network and the Internet, scanning for ICMP, UDP and TCP.		<b>X</b>
<b>9.</b> Scan the vulnerability caused by installed inappropriate configuration or administration of the OS and Firewall itself.	<b>X</b>	
<b>10.</b> Spoofed Address Filtering Spoofed packets is an intrusion technique which is widely used by hackers. So, Firewall must be configured properly to protect internal network from such technique.	<b>X</b>	
<b>11.</b> Port Scanning with Firewall	<b>X</b>	

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## Direction for the future work

- 1. Time synchronization,** Time synchronization is pretty important for security especially for investigation and computer forensic. If Firewall's log has been appropriate configured, there are a lot of evidences could be found on this log. However without synchronized time, the materiality of this record might not be reliable. Therefore, in the audit checklists must be including the measurement of time synchronization maintaining process on the Firewall.
- 2. High availability Firewall testing ,** as a gateway to the internet , now the availability of the Firewall is also important issue. There are a lot of High Availability products such as Stone Beat that integrate with the Firewall-1 to make it more reliable. However more components will introduce more vulnerability. There should be some certain measurements and methodology to audit this function.
- 3. Integration with Intrusion Detection System,** There is a feature that allows Firewall-1 to integrate and interoperate with another security tools also IDS via the OPSEC. This will make Firewall-1 to be more "active and dynamic" defense. However, this feature needs more co-operations between firewall and other equipment, which is IDS. Thus, it needs more measurement to ensure that implementation of interoperation between firewall and IDS system is consistent and reliable. Moreover, network base IDS sometimes detect false positive events, the event that is not really malicious action; some audit measurement should be defined to test firewall in responding false positive events.
- 4. Automatic Rule Base testing,** Firewall is protect the network regard to what design in Rule Base, but the Rule Base itself can be unintentionally misconfigured by the administrator. There should be some tools that can import the Firewall Rule Base and generate the scanning traffic to test against all of the rules. Therefore the result will show all condition of traffic that could pass Firewall to the protected network. Firewall-1 store the Rule Base in text file , there might be somehow to using script to enumerate all the rules and generate the scanning packets with Nmap through the Firewall to test whether each rule is protect as expectation.
- 5. Performance monitoring & testing ,** In this research, there is no subjective measurement to ensure that performance of the Firewall has been properly tuned and monitored . There is also no objective measurement that can be used to measure the current performance indicator. The additional auditing criteria should be developed to cover this area. There should be some tools to perform "stress test" on the Firewall to make sure that it complies with the minimum specification.

## Appendix A. Firewall-1 Vulnerability list .

\*\* From BugTraq [www.securityfocus.com](http://www.securityfocus.com) \*\*

**Table 1. List by Vulnerability.**

Bugtraq ID	Details	Vulnerable
2001-07-09:2952	RDP Header Firewall Bypassing	FW-1 [ VPN+DES+STRONG] 4.1 SP2 Build 41716 FW-1 [ VPN+DES+STRONG] 4.1 Build 41439 FW-1 [ VPN+DES] 4.1
2001-01-17::2238	Denial of Service	FW-1 4.1 SP3 + Solaris 2.6  FW-1 4.1 SP3 + Solaris 2.5.1 FW-1 4.1 SP2 FW-1 4.1
2001-01-14:2143	Fastmode TCP Segment	FW-1 4.1 SP2
2000-11-01:1890	Valid Username	FW-1 4.0  FW-1 3.0
2000-08-15:1662	Session Agent Dictionary Attack	FW-1 4.1  FW-1 4.0 FW-1 3.0
2000-08-02:1890	Unauthorized RSH/REXEC connection	FW-1 4.1  FW-1 4.0 FW-1 3.0
2000-07-05:1419	Spoofed Source Denial of Service	FW-1 4.1  FW-1 4.0 FW-1 3.0
2000-06-30:1416	SMTP Resource Exhaustion	FW-1 4.1  FW-1 4.0

**Table 2. List by Firewal version**

Version	Vulnerability
4.1 SP3 + Solaris 2.6 , 2.5.1	Denial of Service Fast Mode TCP Fragment
4.1 SP2 Build 41716	RDP Header Firewall Bypassing Fast Mode TCP Fragment
4.1 Build 41439	RDP Header Firewall Bypassing
4.1	RDP Heaser Firewlll Bypassing Session Agent Dictionary Attack Unauthorized RSH/REXEC SMTP Resource Exhaustion Fragmented Packet Dos
4.0	Vaild Username Vulnerability

	RDP Heaser Firewlll Bypassing Session Agent Dictionary Attack Unauthorized RSH/REXEC SMTP Resource Exhaustion Fragmented Packet Dos
--	---

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## Appendix B.

\*\*\* From *Armoring Solaris*, Preparing solaris for firewall by Lants Spitzner ,  
[www.enteract.com/~lspitz/core7.txt](http://www.enteract.com/~lspitz/core7.txt)

### Core Packages

system	SUNWcar	Core Architecture, (Root)
system	SUNWcsd	Core Solaris Devices
system	SUNWcsl	Core Solaris, (Shared Libs)
system	SUNWcsr	Core Solaris, (Root)
system	SUNWcsu	Core Solaris, (Usr)
system	SUNWdfb	Dumb Frame Buffer Device Drivers
system	SUNWesu	Extended System Utilities
system	SUNWhmd	SunSwift SBus Adapter Drivers
system	SUNWkey	Keyboard configuration tables
system	SUNWkvm	Core Architecture, (Kvm)
system	SUNWlibC	Sun Workshop Compilers Bundled libC
system	SUNWlibms	Sun WorkShop Bundled shared libm
system	SUNWloc	System Localization
system	SUNWos86u	Platform Support, OS Functionality (Usr)
system	SUNWpd	PCI Drivers
system	SUNWploc	Partial Locales
system	SUNWploc1	Supplementary Partial Locales
system	SUNWqfed	Sun Quad FastEthernet Adapter 32bit Driver
SUNWswmt	Install and Patch Utilities	system
system	SUNWter	Terminal Information
system	SUNWudfr	Universal Disk Format 1.50

### Optional Packages

system	SUNWdoc	Documentation tools
system	SUNWman	Online Manual Pages
system	SUNWfns	Federated Naming System

### Security Packages

System	SECclean	: The core package
System	GNUrcs	: RCS 5.7 and diff 2.7 [GNU]
System	GNUgzip	: gzip 1.2.4a [GNU]
System	PARCdaily	
System	GNUgzip and GNUrcs	
System	WVtcpd	: tcp_wrappers 7.6 + rpcbind 2.1 [Wietse Venema]
System	PRFtripw	: Tripwire 1.2 [Purdue Research Foundation of Purdue University]
System	OPENssh	: OpenSSH 2.3.0p1 [OpenSSH.com]

### Firewall Packages

application	CPdtm-41	Check Point Policy Server
application	CPfw1-41	Check Point VPN-1/FireWall-1
application	CPgui-41	Check Point FireWall-1 GUI

## Appendix C. Firewall Ports

\*\*\*\*\* From Which ports does Firewall-1 use ?, By Dameon D. Welch ,  
[www.phoneboy.com/faq/0105.html](http://www.phoneboy.com/faq/0105.html)

- **TCP Port 256** is used for three important things:
  - Exchange of CA and DH keys in FWZ and SKIP encryption between two FireWall-1 Management Consoles
  - SecuRemote build 4005 and earlier uses this port to fetch the network topology and encryption keys from a FireWall-1 Management Console
  - When installing a policy, the management console uses this port to push the policy to the remote firewall.
- **TCP Port 257** is used by a remote firewall module to send logs to a management console.
- **TCP Port 258** is used by the fwpolicy remote GUI.
- **TCP Port 259** is used for Client Authentication.
- **UDP Port 259** is used in FWZ encryption to manage the encrypted session (SecuRemote and FireWall-1 to FireWall-1 VPNs).
- **UDP Port 260** and UDP Port 161 are used for the SNMP daemon that Check Point FireWall-1 Provides.
- **TCP Port 264** is used for Secure Client (SecuRemote) build 4100 and later to fetch network topology and encryption keys from a FireWall-1 Management Console
- **TCP port 265**, Check Point VPN-1 Public Key Transfer Protocol. This is used by FireWall-1 to exchange public keys with other hosts.
- **UDP Port 500** is used for ISAKMP key exchange between firewalls or between a firewall and a host running Secure Client.
- **TCP Port 900** is used by FireWall-1's HTTP Client Authentication mechanism.
- **TCP Ports above 1024** are generally any Security Servers that are active. The actual ports used by these servers will vary.
- **TCP Port 18181** is used for CVP (Content Vectoring Protocol, for anti-virus scanning).
- **TCP Port 18182** is used for UFP (URL Filtering Protocol, for WebSense and the like).
- **TCP ports 18183** is used for SAM (Suspicious Activity Monitoring, for intrusion detection).
- **TCP ports 18184** is used for Log Export API (lea) .

## Appendix D. Solaris 2.7 and Firewall-1 Plugins for Nessus

Id Name

---

10335 Nmap tcp connect() scan  
10330 Services  
10126 in.fingerd |command@host bug  
10269 SSH Overflow  
10073 Finger redirection check  
10675 CheckPoint Firewall-1 Telnet Authentication Detection  
10676 CheckPoint Firewall-1 Web Authentication Detection  
10264 Default community names of the SNMP Agent  
10688 Obtain network interfaces list via SNMP  
10582 HTTP version spoken  
10472 SSH Kerberos issue  
10337 QueSO  
10550 Obtain processes list via SNMP  
10068 Finger  
10551 Obtain network interfaces list via SNMP  
10265 An SNMP Agent is running  
10223 RPC portmapper  
10268 SSH Insertion Attack  
10244 ypxfrd service  
10243 ypupdated service  
10242 yppasswd service  
10241 ypbind service  
10209 X25 service  
10240 walld service  
10239 tooltalk service  
10238 tfsd service  
10281 Detect Server type and version via Telnet  
10237 sunlink mapper service  
10236 statmon service  
10249 EXPN and VRFY commands  
10235 statd service  
10234 sprayd service  
10233 snmp service  
10159 News Server type and version  
10280 Telnet  
10232 showfhd service  
10231 selection service  
10072 Finger dot at host feature  
10267 SSH Server type and version  
10230 sched service  
10229 sadmin service  
10263 SMTP Server type and version  
10228 rusersd service  
10227 rstatd service  
10226 rquotad service  
10225 rje mapper service  
10653 Solaris FTPd tells if a user exists  
10224 rexd service  
10222 nsemntd service  
10090 FTP site exec  
10195 Usable remote proxy  
10194 Proxy accepts POST requests



10260 HELO overflow  
10221 nused service  
10220 nlockmgr service  
10219 nfsd service  
10218 llockmgr service  
10092 FTP Server type and version  
10217 keyserv service  
10070 Finger backdoor  
10216 fam service  
10087 FTP real path  
10215 etherstatd service  
10214 database service  
10082 FTPd tells if a user exists  
10607 SSH1 CRC-32 compensation attack  
10213 cmsd service  
10212 automountd service  
10081 FTP bounce check  
10211 amd service  
10210 alis service  
10208 3270 mapper service  
10201 Relative IP Identification number change  
10193 Usable remote proxy on any port  
10198 Quote of the day  
10069 Finger zero at host feature  
10107 HTTP Server type and version  
10168 Detect talkd server port and protocol version  
10158 NIS server  
10640 Kerberos PingPong attack  
10114 icmp timestamp request  
10113 icmp netmask request  
10061 Echo port open  
10663 DHCP server info gathering  
10052 Daytime  
10043 Chargen  
10651 cfinger's version  
10652 cfingerd format string attack  
10031 bootparamd service  
10192 Proxy accepts CONNECT requests  
10028 Determine which version of BIND name daemon is running  
10029 BIND vulnerable  
10038 Cfinger's search.\*\*@host feature  
10539 Useable remote name server  
10125 Imap buffer overflow  
10605 BIND vulnerable to overflows  
10423 qpopper euidl problem  
10275 Systat  
10608 OpenSSH 2.3.1 authentication bypass vulnerability  
10157 netstat  
10185 POP3 Server type and version  
10130 ipop2d buffer overflow  
10021 Identd enabled  
10044 Checkpoint FW-1 identification  
10617 Checkpoint SecureRemote detection  
10203 rexecd  
10245 rsh  
10205 rlogin  
10407 X Server

10452 wu-ftpd SITE EXEC vulnerability  
10464 proftpd 1.2.0preN check  
10634 proftpd exhaustion attack  
10084 ftp USER, PASS or HELP overflow  
10086 Ftp PASV on connect crashes the FTP server  
10088 Writeable FTP root  
10083 FTP CWD ~root  
10332 ftp writeable directories  
10380 rsh on finger output  
10329 BIND buffer overrun  
10684 yppasswdd overflow  
10279 Teardrop  
10692 ftpd strtok() stack overflow  
10687 Too long POST command  
10271 stream.c  
10544 format string attack against statd  
10338 smad  
10515 Too long authorization  
10266 UDP null size going to SNMP DoS  
10319 wu-ftpd SITE NEWER vulnerability  
10320 Too long URL  
10318 wu-ftpd buffer overflow  
10191 ProFTPD pre6 buffer overflow  
10133 Land  
10190 ProFTPD buffer overflow  
10074 Firewall/1 UDP port 0 DoS  
10030 Bonk  
10189 proftpd mkdir buffer overflow  
10620 EXPN overflow  
10085 Ftp PASV denial of service  
10648 ftp 'glob' overflow  
10374 uw-imap buffer overflow after logon  
10625 IMAP4rev1 buffer overflow after logon  
10197 qpopper LIST buffer overflow

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4. CheckPoint Firewall Audit Work Program by Terry Cavender  
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[www.auditnet.org/docs/CheckpointFirewall.txt](http://www.auditnet.org/docs/CheckpointFirewall.txt)
5. [BugTraq ] From [www.securityfocus.com](http://www.securityfocus.com)
6. Auditing Routers and Firewalls By David Rhoades From SANS 2001 ,  
Baltimore , Maryland
7. Which ports does Firewall-1 Use ? By Dameon D welch  
<http://www.phoneboy.com/fag/0105.html>
8. Solaris 7 Recommended Patch  
<http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-access>

## Tools

1. Nmap download from [www.insecure.org/nmap](http://www.insecure.org/nmap)
2. Nessus by Renuad Deraison, download from [www.nessus.org](http://www.nessus.org)
3. Lacroex by Laurent Constantin, download from  
[www.laurentconstantin.com](http://www.laurentconstantin.com)
4. Firewalk by Mike D.Schiffman and David E.Goldsmith, download from  
<http://www.packetfactory.net/firewalk>
5. Patchcheck by Sun Microsystem inc, download from  
<ftp://sunsolve.sun.com/pub/patches/patchdiag.xref>